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The United States securities experience includes, in addition to the Federal
Securities Act of 1933, a second stage of regulation, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. 4" The principal focus of the 1934 Act was the regulation of
trading in securities after their initial issuance. The government's general in-
tent here was to regulate the securities markets and the activities of broker-
dealers. 4 6 To some degree the Venezuelan Capital Markets Law also attempts
to do this.
Under the 1934 Act there are two key informational requirements. Section
12 of the 1934 Act'"7 requires registration of any security that is traded on a na-
tional securities exchange, or an equity security where the corporation has
total assets in excess of $1 million and the security is held by 500 or more per-
sons.'"" Also, a corporation with a security registered under Section 12 must
file periodic reports with the SEC so as to keep current the information con-
tained in the original filing.'
4 9
The Venezuelan law is similar to the 1934 Act up to this point. The
Venezuelan law does not expressly provide for registration of any security on
the basis of its being traded on a national securities exchange or being issued
by a company with a certain bolivar amount of assets. Rather, Article 17 of the
Venezuelan law 5 ° generally provides that all securities which are publicly of-
fered under the terms of the Capital Markets Law are subject to the control of
the CNV.' 5 ' In this regard, the Venezuelan law has apparently combined into
*Mr. Johnson is a senior law student at Southern Methodist University School of Law.
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one overall registration requirement the registration information which is re-
quired to be filed separately under the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Venezuelan law also provides for the filing of periodic reports with the
CNV so as to update the original registration information.' All companies
whose securities are listed in the National Securities Register ' 3 5, 14 are subject
to this periodic filing requirement. 5' Information which must be provided
annually includes a balance sheet, profit and loss statement, and statements as
to movement of surplus and working capital accounts, all to be certified by an
independent public accountant.'5 6 A report dealing with the financial condi-
tion of the company is also to be filed twice a year.' 57 The latter section is
especially vague and ambiguous, since there is no indication as to what type of
financial information is required. Additionally, a special report must be made
to the CNV when a company which has previously made a public offering has
entertained proposals for a merger, an increase or decrease in capital, a change
in corporate purpose, or entering into a substantial transfer of assets.'5 8 Once
again the author notes that this provision is especially vague in that it does not
provide any time limits as to filing or indication of what constitutes a
"substantial transfer of assets" or what is considered to be a "change in cor-
porate purpose."
The financial reporting requirements of the Venezuelan law take on added
importance in view of the broad grant of authority given to the CNV to effec-
tuate the law. In regard to the annual reporting requirements, the CNV is
specifically authorized to require submission of any information which it
deems necessary to enforce the law.' In the section dealing with the special
filing report' 61 for mergers and change of corporate purpose, the CNV is
empowered to require submission of whatever information it deems necessary.
The broadest grant of inspection authority given to the CNV is found in Arti-
cle 116.161 Specifically, the CNV is able to carry out inspection of the books of
any company if it believes it necessary to properly analyze the financial
statements submitted by another company.' 6 This right of inspection by the
CNV is not unlimited, however, since the confidentiality requirements of Arti-
'"id. art. 112, at 12.
'"id. art. 10, § 7, at 2.
'4Id. art. 14, at 3.
"5d.
1'1d. art. 112, § 1,5, at 12.
1id. § 2, at 12.
"'Id. art. 115, at 12.
'1Id. art. 112, § 7, at 12.
1'Id. art. 115, at 12.
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162Id
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 2
Venezuelan Securities Legislation-Part II
cle 16 apply.' 3 As such, this specially obtained information will not neces-
sarily be made public, since Article 16 gives the CNV the authority to designate
any information obtained by it as confidential.' 4
The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law left untouched a number of areas
which are of paramount importance under the 1934 Act. Two of the most im-
portant enforcement provisions of the 1934 Act are Section 10(b)"6 and SEC
Rule lOb-5.' 66 Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to "use or employ ... any
manipulative or deceptive device in contravention of such rules ... as the
[Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe" in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. " 7 The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 in order
to implement Section 10(b). Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful to do any of the
following things in connection with the purchase or sale of any security: 1) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 2) to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements not misleading; or 3) to engage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person.'"6 Section 10(b)
does not expressly provide for a civil remedy. However, Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 together implicitly create a right of action in favor of the injured
party. 169,170
There are a number of key elements for an action to be brought under Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. First, there must be manipulative or deceptive con-
duct on the part of the defendant. Second, where the alleged violation con-
cerns misrepresentation or nondisclosure, it must be shown that the informa-
tion at issue was material. Third, in any private action for damages liability
cannot be based on negligent conduct alone; rather, there must be a showing
of the defendant's intent or scienter. 17' Reliance or causation was previously
believed to be an essential element of a lOb-5 action (i.e., it must appear that
the plaintiff in some way relied on the defendant's misrepresentation or non-
disclosure).7 However, the importance of this element has been lessened by
recent Supreme Court holdings. 73
Under the 1934 Act the following hypothetical situation would be regulated:
'Id. art. 16, at 3.
'"Id.
' 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1976).
'15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
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the management of the fictional CATC [introduced earlier as the company in
which Seflor Diaz has a minority shareholder interest] issued a press release to
the Venezuelan Commercial Journal on January 1, 1977. This press release
was designed to quell rumors which had been circulating for over one month
about a rich iron ore strike by a subsidiary of CATC in the interior of
Venezuela. The statement indicated that recent reports exaggerated the scale of
operations and mentioned plans and statistics of size and grade of ore that
were without factual basis and were evidently originated by speculation of peo-
ple not connected with CATC. The statement to the Journal indicated that
CATC's subsidiary had been conducting some mineral exploration in the in-
terior for six years and that this was simply one part of the overall search for
various minerals. Some core drillings in the Zapara mineral tract had recently
been undertaken as part of the program. The statement further noted,
however, that the work done to date had not been sufficient to reach definite
conclusions, and any report as to size and the grade of ore would be premature
and probably misleading. In fact, as of January 1, 1977, the management of
CATC knew that drilling tests had been successfully completed and that a ma-
jor iron ore discovery had been made by the company. Based upon this infor-
mation Seflor Diaz, on January 2, 1977, decided to sell 500 shares of his stock
in CATC. Subsequently, it was learned that these shares were immediately
purchased by the Sanchez brothers. On February 1, 1977 Seflor Diaz learned
that his prior decision was hasty, for on that day CATC announced a major
iron ore discovery in the Zapara region. Thereafter, CATC's stock climbed to
unprecedented heights.
The previously mentioned statements of the management of CATC ap-
parently are not regulated by the Venezuelan Capital Markets Law. The ad-
ministrative and penal provisions of the law do not address themselves to mak-
ing unlawful any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security. Rather, the emphasis of the law's three main en-
forcement provisions is on ensuring compliance with registration information
requirements; to this end the law makes it unlawful to submit false informa-
tion to the CNV.'7 " The absence in the Venezuelan Capital Markets Law of
protective devices such as Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is especially important,
since the practical effect of these two provisions is to encourage enforcement
of the 1934 Act by allowing a private cause of action. The SEC cannot in-
vestigate and discover every securities violation.''
Another important enforcement provision of the 1934 Act is Section 16,176
1"1973 Law, arts. 146, 148, 149, at 14-15.
"Kardon v. National Gypsum, 203 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1973).
615 U.S.C. § 78p (1970).
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which deals with "short-swing" profits resulting from trading in the com-
pany's shares by certain types of insiders. Section 16(a) has a specific
disclosure requirement whereby every person who, directly or indirectly, is the
beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of any class of security which is
registered under Section 12 of the Act,' or who is a director or officer of the
corporation which has issued securities, must file periodic reports showing the
amount of the company's securities which he beneficially owns, or any
changes in his holdings. These reports must be filed with the SEC and with any
national securities exchange on which the stock is traded. An initial report
must be filed within ten days after a person has become a 10 percent
shareholder, officer, or director. Under Section 16(b), any profit realized by
an "insider" from the purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase of the com-
pany's securities within any period of less than six months is recoverable by the
company.' 9
The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law does not expressly deal with the prob-
lem of "insider" trading. There is no disclosure requirement for the three
"insider" groups-10 percent shareholders, directors, and officers-as there
is in the 1934 Act. Likewise, the Venezuelan law does not provide for the
return of "insider" profits to the company. If any "insider" trading activities
were to be discovered, it would probably have to be done on the basis of com-
piling the registration data submitted to the CNV under Articles 2011 and
112. 180 However, since most of this information is to be reported on an annual
basis, it would be of little use in detecting "insider" activities. Also, even if
"insider" trading was discovered, there are no express administrative or penal
sanctions to remedy the problem. The silence of the Venezuelan Capital
Markets Law in this regard is troublesome, since one of the major criticisms of
the securities markets prior to 1973 was that there did not exist any legal pro-
hibition against using inside information in securities transactions.' 8'
Although specific examples were not cited in the Deltec report, it was noted
that there were many notorious abuses in this respect. 8 '
Significantly, it is noted that certain existing provisions of the Venezuelan
law might be utilized to safeguard shareholder rights. Article 266 of the
Venezuelan Commercial Code'83 deals with the liability of corporate directors
to shareholders. A leading Venezuelan jurist's interpretation of this provision
177Id
17SId.
1973 Law, art. 20, at 3-4.
" Id. art. 112, at 12.
"'CEMLA, at 23.
1 92d.
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indicates that a person who has purchased company shares based upon false or
exaggerated information provided by a director has a right to recover damages
against such wrong-doing director. 184 Article 370 of the Venezuelan Commer-
cial Code also establishes liability for anyone who acts fraudulently by means
of forgery, false public statements, or other falsehoods, with the desire to ob-
tain or intent to obtain shares or bonds.' 85 Query: do these two provisions in-
clude within the scope of their coverage the "omission" of a material fact? Do
these provisions have scienter requirements such that the plaintiff must show
that the defendant acted with the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud? Is
there a requirement that the plaintiff show that in some way he relied upon the
defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure?
Possible use of the Venezuelan Commercial Code by a shareholder certainly
raises the question of when and to what type of transactions the code applies.
Also, will the Commercial Code apply if the shareholder bringing the action is
not a merchant? This latter question arises in cases of "mixed" transactions
where the transaction is commercial for one party (e.g., the director or the
company) but not for the other party (e.g., the shareholder). Under the broad
scope of Articles 1 '86 and 2187 of the Venezuelan Commercial Code, many
"mixed" transactions are brought within the sweep of the Commercial Code.
This is based upon the code's emphasis on the "mercantile act," as opposed to
being solely on a person's as a "merchant."" ' 8 The Commercial Code's defini-
tions of "mercantile acts" consist of lengthy and unsystematic enumera-
tions.'89 The primary influence for this "mixed transaction" approach of the
Venezuelan Commercial Code can be traced to the French Commercial Code
model.' 9 , 9' In response to the initial inquiries, then, it would appear that a
shareholder would not be precluded from bringing an action under provisions
of the Venezuelan Commercial Code. However, it is noted that one problem
with the "mixed transaction" approach is that it often results in frustrating the
protective purpose of a Civil Code provision and in oppression of the weaker
party. 91
An injured shareholder can also seek judicial relief by utilizing the
Venezuelan Civil Code. Article 1.185 19" of the code provides -that anyone who
111J. ARISMENDI, TRATADO DE LAS SOCIEDADES CIVILES Y MERCANTILES, § 392, at 339 (2d ed.
1949).
" CODIGO DE COMERCIo, art. 370, at 414.
116Id. art. 1, at 39.
"'Id. art. 2, at 39-61.
"'Id. art. 1, at 39.
'"Id. art. 2, at 39-61.
"R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 404-09 (1970).
11,J. ARISMENDI, TRATADO DE LAS SOCIEDADES CIVILES Y MERCANTILES 17 (2d ed. 1949).
11R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 408(1970).
"9O. LAZO, CODIGO CIVIL DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA, art. 1.185, at 601-03 (1962).
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with intent, or through negligence or imprudence, has caused injury to
another, is obligated to repair such injury. Two independent sources indicate
that this provision would be especially suited to a situation involving use of
manipulative or deceptive devices or an untrue statement or omission of a
material fact by a director or company. According to Professor Arismendi's
analysis, this provision covers omissions or the giving of false information to
the public.' 94 A second interpretation supports this position by analogy to the
corresponding French Civil Code provision. According to Professor Yates,
Article 1.382' gs of the French Civil Code would implicitly include within its
coverage omission of a material fact (e.g., possible impact on a merger
transaction of an unfavorable decision in pending litigation).' 96
The Venezuelan Penal Code also provides possible remedies for an injured
shareholder. Article 444197 of the code deals with fraud and specifically in-
cludes within its coverage corporate directors. The scope of the provision is
quite broad: anyone who uses any means of deceit to obtain for himself or
others some gain or unjust profit with detriment to another is subject to a
prison sentence of from six to thirty months.' 98 Query: would this provision
also include omissions of material facts which prove injurious to shareholders?
Two factors seem to work against this provision previously having been an ef-
fective shareholder's protective device. First, any action brought under this
Article would apparently have to be brought by an individual without the
assistance of the state. Elements working against widespread investor reliance
upon this device are common to many legal systems-burdensome litigation
expenses, court delay, and judicial inexperience in this field. Second, this Ar-
ticle's burden of proof, much like the state statutes which allow common law
actions in the United States prior to the federal securities legislation of 1933
and 1934, is rather stringent in that it does require a showing of scienter or
criminal intent.
A third significant provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 dealt
with Section 14 and the regulation of proxies.'9 9 The importance of the regula-
tion of proxies was aptly noted by Professor Loss: "The proxy rules are very
likely the most effective disclosure device in the SEC scheme of things. The
proxy literature, unlike the application for registration and the statutory
"'J. ARISMENDI, TRATADO DE LAS SOCIEDADES CIVILES Y MERCANTILES, § 390, at 338 (2d ed.
1949).
111E. WRIGHT, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, art. 1.382, at 256 (1908).
1"6Yates, Substantive Law Aspects of Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Between Foreigners in
France: The Competence Question, 9 INT'L LAW. 267-68 (April 1975).
"'Leyes y Decretos de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela, Tomo V, CODIGO PENAL, art. 444, at
628 (1943).
1"Id.
'"15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
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reports, gets into the hands of investors. Unlike the [1933] Securities Act pro-
spectus, it gets there in time. It is more readable than any of these other
documents and it gets to a good number of people who never see a prospec-
tus."5 100
Two additional factors underscore the importance of proxies. First, they are
an effective device for perpetuating existing management and its policies. Sec-
ond, they provide management with essentially a free rein to say whatever it
desires in any proxy solicitation campaign.
In another article dealing with proxy contests, it was noted that the proxy
rules provide a three-level approach to the voting problems of the shareholder.
First, the shareholder has the opportunity to solicit proxies from fellow
shareholders, and to force the management to include in its proxy statement
shareholder proposals. Second, the rules require full disclosure of all material
pertinent to proposals for corporate action submitted by the management to
shareholders by means of proxies. Third, the use of fraud in the solicitation of
proxies is made unlawful.2 1'
Unlike the 1933 Act, the Venezuelan Capital Markets Law does not address
the issue of regulation of proxies. In addition, the Venezuelan Commercial
Code makes only one specific reference to proxies, whereby it prohibits direc-
tors, managers and comisarios from serving as proxies at shareholder
meetings.202 A study of the Venezuelan stock exchanges conducted in the mid
1960s indicates that there does exist a proxy system whereby a shareholder may
authorize another person to attend a meeting and vote.2"3 This study noted
that the proxies are frequently solicited by corporate management. 204 In view
of the above-mentioned importance of proxy solicitation, it is difficult to
understand why this vital area was left untouched by the Capital Markets Law.
Intermediate Financial Institutions
As was noted previously, there are a number of prerequisites which are
necessary for the finance system to work effectively as a method of generating
savings. One of these prerequisites is that intermediate financial institutions
such as banks, stock exchanges and mutual funds exist so as to collect and
channel into productive investments those funds which the working and in-
vesting population has saved. The only intermediate financial institutions
which the Venezuelan Capital Markets Law specifically regulates are stock ex-
'
00L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1027 (2d ed. 1961).
2'Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Contest Expenses in Shareholder Democracy, 4 W. RES. L.
REV. 5, at 7 (1953).
'
02CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 285, at 318.
20 D. EITEMAN, STOCK EXCHANGES IN LATIN AMERICA 59 (1966).20 Id.
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changes, "05 brokers,"' transfer agents, 07 and mutual funds.20 8 The author
notes that the law does not regulate underwriters, banks, pension funds, union
funds, or insurance companies.
A significant part of the law provides for a fairly extensive regulation of
stock exchanges. Effective regulation in this area was definitely needed since
the exchanges were essentially unregulated prior to 1973.09 In large part this
was due to the fact that the exchanges never applied disciplinary measures
against any of their members or revoked any company's listing if it violated
the exchange's regulations."'
Under Article 78 of the Capital Markets Law each securities exchange is
constituted as a corporation.21 ' The management of the exchange is structured
in such a manner that it is under the control of the brokers. 22 Although the ex-
changes are self-regulating, all of their rules governing their conduct and
operations must be approved by the CNV. 2 13 The exchanges are also subject to
the disclosure requirements of the law and must permit inspection of their
books by the CNV. 2
In addition, the activities of brokers are regulated, and violators of the rules
are subject to expulsion or suspension from the exchange." I Of special interest
is the prohibition against fixing securities prices or altering the free play of
supply and demand in any way.2"" Query: exactly what type of activity would
unlawfully alter the free play of supply and demand? Would a broker owning
substantial shares of stock in one company be prohibited from "dumping"
these shares on the market and thereby causing the market price of the stock to
be depressed?
A major purpose in regulating the securities exchanges was to specifically
limit the number of exchanges. 2 " Under the law, each city is allowed only one
securities exchange. 218 This provision was apparently aimed at forcing the
merger of the country's two existing exchanges-the Caracas and the Miranda
exchanges. The merger effort was completed in 1974, when a fifty-seat ex-




2071d. arts. 104-110, at 11.
2
°1d. arts. 62-77, at 7-8.
'
0 CEMLA, at 89,96.
"1 Id. at 92.
''1973 Law, art. 78, at 8.
1"Id. art. 83, at 9.
2 "Id. art. 81, at 8-9.
"
4Id. art. 86, at 9.
1"d. arts. 88,90, at 9-10.
2 "Id. art. 101, at 10.
2"Id. art. 79, at 8.
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change located in Caracas began to function." 9 The overriding practical con-
sideration in this instance was that the actual volume of transactions previous-
ly was not sufficient to adequately support financially brokers of both the
competing exchanges.220 As such, prior to 1973 many brokers dealt in
securities transactions only on a part-time basis and could hardly have been
considered professionals. 22
A significant aspect of limiting each city to only one stock exchange is that
the government has created a monopoly of sorts. Brokerage fees are now
regulated and approved by the CNV,2 22 as are all the major functions and
duties of the exchanges. 23
In regard to the securities exchanges, the Capital Markets Law overlooked
two important problem areas. First, the law did not specifically prohibit over-
the-counter securities transactions. As a result, a parallel market will be per-
mitted to compete with the officially sanctioned Caracas exchange. This was a
problem prior to 1973, since it deprived the organized exchanges of valuable
commissions.22'
The law was also deficient in terms of not specifically regulating under-
writers. As Professor Roth noted in his article dealing with the Brazilian and
Israeli markets, legal prerequisites of competence and financial responsibility
and established standards of conduct are vital in a system based on disclosure,
whereby the lay investor is by necessity almost forced to rely on these people
when dealing in the complicated matters of securities investment.2
One possible remedy for this defect in the law is to expressly require that any
issue of securities may be offered only through a qualified intermediary.226
Additionally, there could be a requirement that underwriters register with the
CNV and comply with certain requirements as to capitalization, commissions,
professional conduct, and technical competence.127
Prior to the Capital Markets Law the process of transferring shares was
neither easy nor rapid, and resulted in the liquidity of the market being im-
peded. 28 In order to alleviate this problem, and to establish norms of con-
duct, the law expressly regulates transfer agents. 2 9 These agents, generally
"'18 BANK OF LONDON & SOUTH AMERICA REPORT 439 (July 1974).
"10CEMLA, at 91.
221Id
"'1973 Law, art. 81, § 6, at 8.
111Id. arts. 78-103, at 8-11.2"'A. BASCH & M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 65 (1970).
"'Roth, Capital Market Development in Israel and Brazil: Two Examples of theRole of Law in
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International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 2
Venezuelan Securities Legislation-Part II
banks, are retained by a company with widely traded securities for the purpose
of managing stock ownership transfers and mailing dividend and interest
checks. The agent issues new certificates upon the surrender of the old ones
and maintains the current list of security holders. Prior to any transfer, the
agent requires appropriate documentation of the right to transfer the
securities. 3 Unlike previously, where transfer delays of months were com-
mon, the transfer agents are now required to complete the process within 20
days after the stockholder makes his request. In order to safeguard investors
against fraud or incompetence, transfer agents are liable for damages suffered
by investors."'
Efforts to strengthen the secondary market have moved beyond the regula-
tory provisions of the Capital Markets Law, and have resulted in the creation
of two new intermediate financial institutions. Significantly, these institutions
are not provided for in the Capital Markets Law, but rather have been created
to facilitate the development of an effective and integrated primary and secon-
dary market. The first institution, Sociedad Financiera Valinvenca, began
operations at the beginning of 1975. A sociedad financiera is technically a
private development bank. It is also referred to as a finance company. This
type of institution is a combination of private development bank, investment
bank and trust company. Financieras are authorized to receive time deposits
and to issue their own bonds of up to ten years' maturity. This type of institu-
tion was originally organized in Mexico in the 1920s, and has been legally
authorized in Venezuela since 1961.212 In Venezuela there are currently twenty-
six financieras, and most of them have tended to concentrate on consumer
financing of durable goods. Since 1975, financieras in Venezuela have been
authorized to invest unlimited amounts in corporate equity and to underwrite
new equity issues. 3 '
Sociedad Financiera Valinvenca, a private company, grew out of a planning
study conducted by the Venezuelan Minister of Finance and the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1971. Equity investors in Valinvenca (total paid-
in capital of $2.3 million) include IFC (15 percent equity investment), J.P.
Morgan Overseas Capital Corporation (20 percent equity investment), Inver-
siones Finalven, S.A. (Venezuela's largest financiera; 35 percent equity in-
vestment); and the Banco Provincial (15 percent equity investment). Valinven-
ca's basic purpose is to facilitate development of the primary market for
securities, and to aid in development of a commercial paper market. In this
role Valinvenca is intended to act as a broker-dealer in the money market, and
110D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATE LAW 950 (1973).
231973 Law, art. 109, at I1.
'A. BASCH & KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 53-55,151 (1970).
'"INVESTING, LICENSING, AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD-Venezuela, Aug. 1975, at 18-19.
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as an underwriter of long-term debt and equity. Valinvenca's initial activity
has been in the money market, where it has issued certificates of deposit and
acted as a paying agent in the placement of commercial paper. When the long-
term capital markets have become sufficiently developed, it is anticipated that
Valinvenca will begin to distribute debt and equity issues on either a best-
efforts or underwritten basis.23 ', " Due to the limited amount of information
available on the activities of this new financial institution, the author is unable
to explain in any greater detail how these issues will be distributed.
The second new financial institution, Sociedad Financiera Promotora del
Mercado de Capitales (PROMECA), was established in 1975. PROMECA, a
joint public-private venture, also grew out of the 1971 planning study con-
ducted by the Venezuelan Minister of Finance and the IFC. Equity investors in
PROMECA (initial paid-in capital of $4.7 million) include the Banco In-
dustrial de Venezuela (a state-owned development bank; 15 percent equity in-
vestment), IFC (15 percent equity investment), and an additional group of 66
local private investors (including thirteen commercial banks, fifteen finan-
cieras, and thirty insurance companies). PROMECA's basic purpose is to
serve as a specialized secondary market liquidity agency and as a market for
long-term debentures issued by industrial firms and financieras.1 6,3
New Techniques To Promote Investment
The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law was especially innovative in estab-
lishing new instruments and devices to encourage investment. An important
example of this innovative effort was the provision expressly permitting the is-
suance of convertible debentures. These instruments did not exist in Venezuela
prior to 1973.28,39 There was no express legal prohibition against convertible
debentures, rather companies were prohibited from having shares authorized
prior to subscription. 24 0' ,2 4 1 ,'24 2
The dual role which this type of security can serve apparently convinced
legislators of its utility. In the case of Venezuela, where so many companies are
closely held, the convertibility feature serves an important function for both
companies and investors. In the early stages of a company's history, when it is
234/d.
"'1FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS-Venezuela, Dec. 1975, at 941-42.
2361d
.
... INVESTING, LICENSING, AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD-Venezuela, Aug. 1975, at 18-19.
"'CEMLA, at 22.
"'A. HERNANDEZ, ALGUNos ASPECTOS DEL REGIMEN DE LA OFERTA PUBLICA DE TITULOS-
VALORES EN VENEZUELA 136-37 (1973).
24Old.
"'CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 249, at 296.
1'R. LOMBARD, AMERICAN-VENEZUELAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, fn. 304, at 77 (1965).
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necessary to raise capital, an investor may be unwilling to accept stock alone
for his contribution and may insist upon the protection of a debt claim. At the
same time, he is probably not satisfied with just a high interest rate as an ade-
quate return for the risk involved. In this context the convertible debenture is
designed to serve the needs and desires of both the company and the investor-
it affords the investor and the company the flexibility which fledgling new




In order to further encourage public investor acceptance of convertible
debentures, special safeguards are provided by the law. 24 5 Primary among
these is the required election of a bondholder representative to look after the
interests of the bondholders. Initially, this representative is to be appointed by
the company, subject to approval by the CNV. The provisional representative
is subsequently to be replaced in an election whereby a new bondholder
representative-possibly a bank, financiera, or insurance company-will be
selected by a majority of the bondholders.2"' The law is somewhat vague in this
area, since it does not indicate how soon the election must take place. In this
subsequent election the company apparently has no vote.
A second means whereby the Venezuelan Capital Markets Law was intended
to facilitate flexibility in financing corporate investment and expansion was
through the creation of an entirely new corporate form, the "authorized
capital" corporation (sociedad anonima de capital autorizado or SACA).24 7
Stock companies with a subscribed capital in excess of one million bolivars are
able to adopt the SACA form." ' Once this form is adopted, company
shareholders may authorize the directors to increase the company's capital
stock to a specific amount through the issuance of new shares.2"9 The key
feature and advantage to the SACA corporate form is that it enables the direc-
tors to increase the company's capital anytime within a two-year period from
the date of shareholder authorization.1 0 Previously, it was much more dif-
ficult and time-consuming for a company to increase its capital stock. Article
280 of the Commercial Code required that any increase in capital stock had to
be voted on at a shareholders' meeting, with at least three-fourths of the
shareholders present. A favorable vote of at least half of the shareholders was
then necessary to approve the increase."'
2
"4W. CARY, CORPORATIONS 1241 (1969).
1"Nunez, De los Titulos Valores Emitidos por las SociedadesAnonimas, 41 U. DEL ZULIA 61-63
(1974).
21973 Law, arts. 36-44, at 5-6.2
"61d. art. 36, at 5.
:'"Id. arts. 48-55, at 6.
2
'Id. art. 48, at 6.
"'Id. art. 51, at 6.
"'Id. art. 52, at 6.
" CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 280, at 317.
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One major aim of the Venezuelan Capital Markets Law was to broaden
the ownership of securities in the country. One means to achieve this goal was
to create mutual funds."' In Venezuela, prior to 1973, no open-end " mutual
funds existed due to the prohibition against a company having variable
capital." Article 299 of the Commercial Code required that shares could not
be fractional and that they must be whole and indivisible. 2",'" The prohibi-
tion against fractional shares was not removed by the Capital Markets Law;
rather, it simply provided that there would henceforth be mutual funds. 2"
Based upon the experience of the more developed countries, however, it was
apparent that widespread investor participation in mutual funds and other
similar institutional type investors could be a crucial factor in successfully
developing the capital markets. 5 The role played by mutual funds in the
United States seems to indicate that they would be well-suited for the
Venezuelan market. Basically, such companies pool the funds of investors,
which are obtained through the sale of shares and bonds, in a portfolio of
securities. The portfolio is specially designed and managed to obtain for
shareholders the benefits of diversification, professional selection and supervi-
sion of securities, and skilled timing of purchases and sales. The idea is that a
shareholder, with a relatively small outlay per share, is able to attain results
superior to those he could obtain through direct investment. In view of the
government's desire to attract large numbers of new and unsophisticated in-
vestors, it is clear that the mutual fund was an attractive and potentially pro-
fitable mechanism. The mutual funds, given their traditional role in the United
States of funneling savings into outstanding securities in the secondary
markets rather than financing new capital investment, offered the real
possibility of strengthening the weak secondary securities market in
Venezuela. As was noted previously, the traditional weakness of the secondary
market in Venezuela was one major factor in discouraging public investor par-
ticipation. There is no indication in the Capital Markets Law whether these
organizations are exempt from corporate tax as in the United States.
A second means whereby the Capital Markets Law encouraged a wider
ownership of securities was through the creation of a new corporate form, the
151973 Law, arts. 62-77, at 7-8.
2
"In an open-end mutual fund the shareholders and capital are variable since the shares are
redeemable; in contrast are closed-end mutual funds, which have a fixed capital and unredeemable
shares. A. BASCH & M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 57 (1970).2 5-d. 58.
2 CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 299, at 351.
116J. ARISMENDI, TRATADO DE LAS SOCIEDADES CIVILES Y MERCANTILES, § 465, at 403-04 (2d. ed.
1949).
"'1973 Law, arts. 62-77, at 7-8.
1'H. DOUGALL, CAPITAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 78-85 (1970).
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"open capital corporation" (sociedad anonima inscrita de capital abierto or
SAICA).2"9 The underlying policy consideration in this regard was to en-
courage closely held companies to place a large part of their capital stock in the
hands of many different investors. The SAICA concept was a deliberate at-
tempt to foster the "democratization" (i.e., wider public ownership) of capital
in Venezuela.26
Initially, a major obstacle for companies to qualify as SAICAs was the re-
quirement of having 50 percent of the company shares distributed among at
least 50 shareholders for each one million bolivars of paid-in capital.26 '
However, this requirement was simply too unrealistic given the then-existing
corporate structure. At that time the country's most widely held company,
Electricidad de Caracas, had only 8,000 shareholders.2 62 As a result, this provi-
sion was reformed in 1975.63 The new provision requires that a SAICA
distribute 50 percent of its shares to the public, but now leaves open the re-
quired number of shareholders and the maximum size of holding.26 ' Query:
does this provision defeat the entire goal of encouraging widespread public
ownership of shares via SAICAs?
The first step in the SAICA campaign centered around special measures
designed to protect minority shareholders and thereby increase public investor
confidence in shareholding. Specific measures provided for minority
shareholder participation in the election of the board of directors.26" ' The law is
not clear as to exactly how the election of the board will take place. However,
the importance of the provision is that it requires that those shareholders who
participate in the election of a majority of the board of directors (a minimum
of five who will hold office for one-year terms) of the SAICA corporation
thereafter cannot participate in the election of the remaining board members
who represent the minority.266 Although it is not specifically designated as
cumulative voting, this provision seems to amount to a type of cumulative
voting in that it guarantees some minority representation on the board. Query:
how, when, and by whom is it to be determined exactly how many members
there will be on the board?
Equally important for minority shareholders is their right to participate in
211973 Law, arts. 56-61, at 6-7.
2
"'Calatchi, Venezuela's Capital Markets Take on an International Flavour, EUROMONEY, Dec.
1976, at 55-56.
2"1973 Law, art. 56, § 3, at 6-7.
262The author notes that there is no information readily available as to how many shares or what
type.26
'Decree 882, 394 (Supp.) Gaceta Legal, art. 60, § 2, at 51, May 31, 1974.
264Id.
-1973 Law, art. 123, at 13.
266id.
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the election of two comisarios.16' Pursuant to Article 125, each comisario is to
be elected separately, with each shareholder allowed to vote only once, unless
the vote is unanimous.1 8 Unfortunately, the provision is somewhat vague in
that there is a question as to whether the comisario election provision applies
only to SAICAs or to all companies under the control of the CNV. In view of
Seflor Diaz' experience with the comisarios of CATC, it is apparent that major
changes have been made in the election of these officials. Previously, they were
elected at the annual shareholders' meeting by a majority of the share-
holders. 6 19 Also, previously no limitation was placed on the relationship of the
board and comisarios. 7 Article 125 changed this latter aspect, since it pro-
hibited comisarios from being either agents of the directors, employees of the
company, or relatives of the directors.27' Query: will these new safeguards now
prevent the comisarios from being a mere puppet of the directors? Will the
comisarios now effectively safeguard minority shareholder rights?
Another innovation in terms of minority shareholder protection is the re-
quirement that a company distribute 50 percent of its net after-tax profits an-
nually, with at least 25 percent of this amount being paid in cash. 72 This provi-
sion is important for two reasons. First, the dividend requirement applies not
only to SAICAs, but to any company making a public offering. Second, this
cash dividend policy could adversely affect a company's expansionary pro-
gram by forcing it to pay out sorely needed capital. Query: to what extent will
this requirement have an adverse impact upon national development by re-
ducing the amount of valuable operating capital available to a company? Cer-
tainly such a change is drastic and clearly runs counter to the traditional prac-
tice and desire of closely held companies to not share profits with outside
elements.
Tax incentives are the primary inducements offered to companies to adopt
the SAICA form. Originally, the law allowed the national executive to grant
tax exemptions up to a maximum of ten years.273 The exemption offered to the
SAICA companies was based on the percentage of stock in the hands of the
public. The maximum exemption available was 15 percent of the tax payable
on the total net income of the company.7 4
Tax exemptions existed for shareholders who purchased SAICA stock. Arti-
cle 131 provided that there was no tax on interest or dividends [from SAICA
...1d. art. 125, at 13.
-6'Id.26'CODIGO DE COMERCIO, art. 287, at 319.
"'Id. art. 309, at 363.
"1973 Law, art. 125, at 13.
"'ld. art. 127, at 13.
"'Id. art. 132, at 13.
" Id. art. 130, at 13.
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stock], and capital gains would also be tax-exempt if they were reinvested in
SAICA securities. 2
7 5
Not totally unexpectedly however, the tax incentives were not considered to
be adequate'76 and resulted in not one company adopting the SAICA form. A
number of different factors can be identified as contributing to the failure of
this part of the 1973 law. The scope of the original law was rather limited in
that it allowed only tax exemptions and made no provision whatsoever for any
tax deductions.17 Tax exemptions have little effect on a company unless it is
already generating sizable corporate profits.2 7 '
In regard to investors, a tax deduction could have acted as an added incen-
tive to them to acquire securities. An example of this is if the 1973 Venezuelan
Capital Markets Law would have allowed taxpayers to deduct from gross in-
come a certain percentage of money spent acquiring SAICA shares. The effect
of the deduction would have been to lower the purchase price of the security
and thereby increase its effective yield. 279
Tax incentives such as exemptions and deductions can be classified as
"marginal" incentives. 8 They operate to change the marginal profitability of
a business venture or the effective yield of a security. However, they influence
decision-making only if economic units-both companies and individuals-
have already calculated the profit potential in a situation, and are prepared to
change their investment decisions based on the marginal difference created by
the incentive.28" ' Obviously, the incentives offered by the 1973 Capital Markets
Law were not sufficiently strong by themselves to change past patterns of
behavior. Closely held corporate enterprises could not be induced to volun-
tarily change their traditional policies and beliefs, and wary investors could
not be induced to discard their fear of investing in company shares.
In large part it was the above-mentioned factors which led to the 1975 re-
vised Capital Markets Law. 282 The 1975 reform version was basically directed
at rectifying the deficiencies in the tax incentives originally offered. The scope
of the new law was quite limited however, since it was specifically aimed at in-
ducing companies to convert to SAICA form. 3 In order to effectuate the new
2
1d. art. 131, at 13.
"Venezuelan Capital Markets Law Offers Only Sketchy Incentives, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA,
March 1, 1973, at 71-72.
17' Venezuela Proposes Personal Tax Breaks to Stimulate Growth of Capital Market, BUSINESS
LATIN AMERICA, April 22, 1971, at 123,125.
'I'D. TRUBEK, LAW, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN CAPITAL MARKET 34 (Bull.
Nos. 72-73, April 1971).
2'91d.
2"Id.
2 2Decree 882, 394 (Supp.) Gaceta Legal 46-59, May 31, 1974.
1"Id. art. 130, at 57.
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law the national executive was given a broad grant of power to decree various
tax incentives, including tax exemptions. 8' The national executive subsequent-
ly decreed new tax exemptions which are considerably more generous than
those offered by the 1973 law.2"s Currently, companies that distribute a
minimum 50 percent of their shares to the public are eligible for a 25 percent
exemption from corporate income tax. If 50-60 percent of the shares are
distributed to the public, then the exemption is 30 percent. If 60-75 percent or
more of the shares are publicly held, then the exemption is 40 percent. If 75
percent or more of the shares are publicly held, then the exemption reaches 50
percent.28
Due to the lack of current information, it is difficult to accurately assess
whether these new incentives will be more successful than the original ones. To
date there are five SAICAs.28 One of the SAICAs, Industrias Berol, opted for
this corporate form for the purpose of complying with the divestment re-
quirements of the Andean Foreign Investment Code.2 8 The remaining com-
panies-Telares de Palo Grande, Sociedad Financiera de Venezuela, and
Banco Provincial-have all apparently opted for the tax exemptions since they
are national companies and are not subject to the Andean Foreign Investment
Code's divestment requirements." 9
Conclusion and Recommendations
There is little doubt that fundamental obstacles continued to impede the
growth and development of the capital market in Venezuela in the period from
1973-76. Investors were still wary of entering the market, companies were hesi-
tant to open up and "go public," vital links in the intermediate financial struc-
ture remained underdeveloped, and the supply and quality of skills needed to
operate such a system were limited. A consideration of selected basic data over
the three-year period in which the Capital Markets Law has been in effect
highlights some of the continuing weaknesses. In 1974, 1.3 billion bolivars
worth of securities were traded on the Caracas stock exchange. Of this total,
bonds accounted for 58 percent, while equity securities accounted for only 12
percent. The remaining 30 percent represented foreign exchange trading.'9 In
May of 1975 bonds accounted for over 60 percent of the securities transac-
tions, with stocks representing 25 percent of the total. 9' Clearly, there has
284/d.
... INVESTING, LICENSING, AND TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD-Venezuela, Aug. 1975, at 18-19.
2961d.
"'Bolin, Investment Climate Improving, Stock Market Shows Signs of Life, Daily Journal
[Ven], Feb. 28, 1977, at 26, col. 3.
3Id.
2191d.
"'FINANCING FOREIGN OPERATIONS-Venezuela, Dec. 1975, at 941.
291Id
.
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 2
Venezuelan Securities Legislation-Part II
been some increased activity on the exchange in terms of equity security trans-
actions. However, it is important to note that the 13 percent increase in the
trading of equity securities was probably somewhat deceptive, since in fact the
activities of the "Caracas" exchange in 1975 were bolstered following-its
merger with the Miranda exchange.
The latter part of 1975 did see some improvements in the public offering of
equity securities. Private companies placed a total of eight registered equity
issues, all with prospectus. These equity issues amounted to 332 million
bolivars ($77 million). However, the market still remains quite thin. At the end
of 1975, only seventy-four companies were registered with the CNV.292 Of the
seventy-four registered companies, the shares of twenty-nine of them were
never traded in 1975,'9" and only twelve out of the total seventy-four were
traded on a regular basis. 9
Indications are that there continues to be a shortage of private sector equity
funds for new ventures. A major contributing factor to this problem is the at-
traction for investors of bonds which currently pay 8 percent tax-free in-
terest." This continuing investor preference for fixed-income securities is part
of a trend which apparently began following the 1958-63 Venezuelan financial
crisis,29 6 and has remained fairly constant since then. Preference for this type
of security, as contrasted with common stocks, has been due to a number of
factors. First, an important degree of liquidity is guaranteed bondholders by
the open market buying operations of the central bank in government bonds
and by the stabilizing operations of the Central Hipotecaria in the case of
mortgage bonds. 9' Second, the net yields on fixed-income securities have
generally compared very favorably with the return on common stocks.2 9'
In looking toward the future the main question is what can be done to
achieve a more viable capital market? The possibilities are many, and certainly
there is room left for improvement. Any consideration will center around the
divestment requirements imposed upon companies in Venezuela by the
Andean Foreign Investment Code. Representatives of all groups-govern-
ment, business, and academic-have previously stated their belief that the
divestment program and a vigorous capital market program go hand-in-hand.
The results to date, however, have not been very encouraging. As of January,
1977 there are indications that only one such public underwriting-involving
292Bolin, Investment Climate Improving, Stock Market Shows Signs of Life, Daily Journal
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Industrias Berol, with a public offering of 296, 800 common shares at twenty
bolivars per share-has occurred.2 99,300
Far more unsettling, however, has been the recent change of events in
Venezuela regarding Decree 62-Venezuela's legislative implementation of the
Andean Foreign Investment Code."' Recent reports indicate that Decree 2031
of February 8, 1977 replaces Decree 62.302 Significantly, the new law provides
for extensive exemptions from the divestment deadlines. In some instances
these dates have been extended from the original target date of May 1977 until
February 1980. Further, the Agency of Foreign Investment (SIEX) of
Venezuela has been given the authority to extend for an undetermined time the
divestment period for a company due to "special circumstances." Such cases
are to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Query: what must a company do
in order to show "special circumstances?"
Three factors contributed to this situation. First, many companies have
encountered difficulties in finding buyers. Second, in many of those cases in
which companies found buyers the government has apparently refused to
authorize the arrangements. The government's actions here are a result of its
desire to ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth among individual in-
vestors and to prevent any further concentration of power in the traditional in-
dustrial groups. Third, private sector business interests have pressed the
government since 1973 to adopt what they believe to be a less stringent and
more realistic approach to foreign investment.30 3
Although it is too early to fully assess the results of this new legislative
reform, it would appear that the immediate result will be to slow down the
divestment process. Given the prior assumption that the foreign investment
code's divestment requirements would stimulate the growth of the capital
market, it is now possible that growth in the market will take place at a slower
rate. There is little doubt that this is an immediate problem which could have a
severely adverse impact on the development of the market.
The extent to which the market will now grow is much more dependent on
factors other than the divestment program. The Venezuelan capital markets
program obviously faces a critical stage of development. Brazil, in the period
from 1966-67, when faced with a crisis of a different nature but of equally im-
portant dimensions, opted for a system of forced savings tax incentives to
... Bolin, Investment Climate Improving, Stock Market Shows Signs of Life, Daily Journal
[Ven], Feb. 28, 1977, at 26, col. 5.
'The underwriter was Sociedad Financiera Promotora del Mercado de Capitales, C.A., of
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stimulate a weak and faltering market." ' The question now is how innovative
Venezuelan planners will be in coping with the new problem situation.
Certainly a possible remedy includes consideration of Brazil's solution to its
problem-Decree Law 157.305 Pursuant to this legal device, an individual tax-
payer was allowed to credit against his income tax that money which he in-
vested in authorized financial institutions. In turn, these institutions then
reinvested the DL 157 funds in the shares or debentures of private firms which
had been approved by the Central Bank of Brazil. The DL 157 credit was
limited to 12 percent of the tax due. In order to qualify for the credit, the tax-
payer would have to hold the DL 157 shares in the authorized financial institu-
tion for at least four years.10 6
The effective operation of a tax incentive such as DL 157 requires two
preconditions. First, there must be a broadly based tax at rates high enough to
encourage a significant number of people to seek the tax relief. Second, there
must be a tax administration system capable of collecting taxes and enforcing
penalties for tax evasion." 7 In the case of Venezuela-unlike Brazil-these
two preconditions are not present. Until these are fulfilled, it is difficult to en-
visage any tax incentive effectively spurring the growth of the capital markets
by inducing greater participation by privately held companies and public
investors.
Traditionally, the petroleum sector's taxes have constituted the bulk of total
government revenues. In 1977 petroleum is expected to contribute approx-
imately 80 percent of the government's tax revenue. 8 In contrast, the
nonpetroleum [private sector] taxes constituted only 9 percent of the govern-
ment's total revenue in 1974.309 Under the current progressive corporate tax
structure (referred to as "schedule A") the corporate tax rate ranges from 15
percent on corporate income of 100,000 bolivars or less, and continues up to
50 percent on corporate income of 28 million bolivars or more.310 Although
there is a progressive individual income tax (referred to as "schedule C") its
contribution to the government's total revenue is also negligible when com-
pared to the petroleum sector. Administration of the tax laws leaves much to
be desired. Tax evasion-by both companies and individuals-is common.
30
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Some estimates indicate that under the current system tax evasion runs as high
as 3 billion bolivars per year."' Although nonpayment of taxes is supposedly
an offense punishable by imprisonment and fines, such penalties are seldom
imposed. 3 2
The absence of ah effective taxation system in Venezuela would obviously
preclude adoption of a DL 157 type device. A solution to this problem might
be found in President Perez' current push for massive tax reform. 3 The new
tax plan would focus on three goals: (1) increase private sector corporate taxes,
such that tax rates would range from 18 percent on corporate income of
100,000 bolivars or less, and continue up to 55 percent on corporate income of
6 million bolivars or more; (2) increase personal income tax for individuals
earning over 200,000 bolivars per year; (3) correct the country's history of tax
evasion by actively punishing nonpayment of taxes with heavy fines and prison
sentences.' 4 Immediate passage of the tax reform plan is unlikely, however,
since it is being bitterly opposed by the main opposition political party and by
large segments of the private business sector.3"'
Given the current state of the tax system in Venezuela, it is the author's
belief that a DL 157 device will not be forthcoming in Venezuela in the near
future, nor is it certain that such a device would necessarily be successful. The
conditions and problems in the Venezuela of today are quite different from
those which induced and enabled Brazilian planner-technocrats to innovate in
the mid-1960s.
It is the author's belief that the area in which there is room for greatest im-
provement is the protection of minority shareholder rights. Although the
Venezuelan Capital Markets Law has provided some protective devices for
shareholders, those that currently exist are not adequate and should be
increased.
First, there is definitely a need for allowing direct shareholder inspection of
company books and records. Even under the Capital Markets Law the share-
holder still does not have this right; rather, this right of inspection is vested in
the CNV. Suggested course of action is to allow for shareholder inspection of
company books and records upon a reasonable request or showing of proper
purpose. Additionally, it could be required that the person requesting inspec-
tion prove that he is a shareholder of record of at least 5 percent or else some
similar appropriately established percentage.
"'Grant, A Race Against Time, Daily Journal [Ven], Feb. 28, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
32 Venezuelan Businessmen Speak Out Strongly Against Proposed Tax Reform, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, Jan. 5, 1977, at 6-7.
'Venezuela: Tough Talk, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL REPORT, March 18, 1977, at 85-86.
"' Venezuelan Businessmen Speak Out Strongly Against Proposed Tax Reform, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, Jan. 5, 1977, at 6-7.
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Second, there exists a serious deficiency in the Capital Market's registration
requirements in regard to the prospectus. As the law stands now, there is no re-
quirement that the prospectus be received by the investor prior to making an
investment decision. The extent of the law now is that an investor would either
have to go down to the CNV to obtain the information on file, or else read it
after it has been published in the National Securities Register. Provision
should be made whereby the investor is readily able to obtain the prospectus
well in advance of making an investment decision.
Third, there should definitely be provision in the Capital Markets Law ex-
pressly allowing private causes of action to be brought by injured share-
holders. These provisions should specifically apply in the case of false registra-
tion information being filed with the CNV.
Fourth, there should be a provision allowing the CNV to effectively deal
with securities violations involving misrepresentations, nondisclosure, and
omissions of material facts (i.e., Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 type violations).
In conjunction with this, there should be an express provision allowing injured
shareholders the right to bring a private cause of action.
Fifth, provision should be made whereby "insider" trading by any cor-
porate officials or employees is specifically prohibited. As part of this, any
"short-swing" profits should be required to be paid back to the corporation.
Both of these provisions should be vigorously enforced by the CNV.
Sixth, specific provisions should be made allowing both derivative suits and
class actions to be brought by injured shareholders. Security fees or court costs
should be kept to a minimum in these cases so as not to discourage shareholder
suits.
Seventh, there should be stringent regulation of proxies and proxy solicita-
tion. As it stands now, the Capital Markets Law does not even address proxy
requirements or regulations.
Eighth, there should be a prohibition against over-the-counter securities
trading. It should be required that all securities transactions be conducted on a
regulated and authorized exchange.
Until these problem areas are adequately dealt with by the Venezuelan
government, there is little reason to believe that public investor confidence in
the market will increase appreciably. The law as it exists now does not offer
adequate public investor protection.
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 2

